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AN OCEAN APART: THE MANDATORY TAKEOVER RULE IN
BRAZIL AND IN EUROPE
Jorge Brito Pereira
ABSTRACT
The common statement that there are two different regulatory systems
concerning the mandatory takeover rule – the market rule system and the equal
opportunity system – is, in practice, overly simplistic: facing the choice between
freedom and strict regulation on whether the control premium should be
proportionally shared with all non-controlling shareholders, some jurisdictions
have adopted a hybrid solution. The Brazilian mandatory takeover rule
(re)approved in 2001 is a good example. This paper will comprehensively
analyse the Brazilian and European rules on mandatory takeover bids, using
empirical data about the Brazilian markets and details of various cases that
tested the limits of the existing regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
There are two coexisting regulatory systems concerning the mandatory
takeover rule (MTR). In countries such as the United States (US), the seller of
the controlling stake receives the control premium in full, and the acquirer of the
controlling stake is free to decide whether to propose acquiring the remaining
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shares and, if so, on what proposed terms and conditions. This is designated as
a market rule system, a private negotiation rule system, or a ‘street’ system. In
other countries such as European Union (EU),1 following a regulatory path
dating back to the 1972 version of the United Kingdom’s (UK’s) City Code on
Takeovers and Mergers,2 the acquirer of a controlling stake in a listed company
(30–33% of voting shares) must extend an offer to purchase the shares of all
other shareholders on equivalent terms and conditions. This is designated as a
sharing rule system or an equal opportunity system.
The US has no general federal MTR, which means the bidder may acquire a
large block of shares (or several large blocks of shares) in a bilateral negotiation
or the stock exchange or may launch a takeover bid to acquire some or all the
target’s shares, regardless of the voting threshold it thereby meets. At the state
level, the only (limited) exceptions are Pennsylvania, Maine, and Utah.3 The
equal treatment of shareholders under the Williams Act (since its original text
of 1968) is limited to federal rules requiring a tender offer to pay the same price
for each acquired share and treat all tendering shareholders equally. These rules
ensure pro rata tender offers, not that all shareholders can necessarily sell all
their shares on conditions equivalent to those offered to the controlling
shareholder.
Differences in takeover regulation between Europe and the US go far beyond
the existence of an MTR, even if this is probably the most iconic; further
examples include the actual role and fiduciary duties of the board of directors
during a takeover (neutrality duty or passivity rule) and the effectiveness of
defence strategies. Generally, the two regulatory approaches are philosophically
different: while the European approach involves relevant restrictions for bidder
and target, as well as larger protection for minority shareholders, the American
approach accepts more freedom for both players.4
1

Council Directive 2004/25, 2004 O.J. (L 142) (EC).
This is conventionally referred to as the City Code or Takeover Code.
3 This exception is not material as these rules are a limited equivalent to the MTR and none of these three
states has a relevant number of listed companies incorporated under their laws. See Jo Watson Hackl & Rosa
Anna Testani, Second Generation State Takeover Statutes and Shareholder Wealth: An Empirical Study, 97
YALE L.J. 1193, 1196 and 1207–1208 (1988); Carole Piacentile Aciman & Peter M Kent, Rights of Minority
Shareholders in the United States Under State Law upon a Sale of Control, INT’L BUS. L.J. 203 (1995); Jeremy
Grant, et al., Financial Tunnelling and the Mandatory Bid Rule, 10 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. (EBOR) (2009);
Stefan Grundmann, The Market for Corporate Control: The Legal Framework, Alternatives, and Policy
Considerations, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN C ONTEXT: CORPORATIONS, STATES, AND MARKETS IN EUROPE,
JAPAN, AND THE US 423-424 (2005).
4 For an overview of the main discrepancies, see Marco Ventoruzzo, Europe’s Thirteenth Directive and
US Takeover Tegulation: Regulatory Means and Political and Economic Ends, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 171 (2006);
Guido Ferrarini & Geoffrey P Miller, A Simple Theory of Takeover Regulation in the United States and Europe,
2
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There are multiple explanations for this regulatory gap. Lucian Bebchuk
points out that the dynamics of regulatory competition between different US
states favour solutions preferred by the incumbent management of listed
corporations.5 Scholars such as John Armour and David Skeel argue that the
respective structures of regulation – informal guidance by the UK’s Panel on
Takeovers and Mergers versus Delaware jurisprudence and federal regulation –
explain why Britain grants shareholders extensive authority whereas significant
managerial discretion is dominant in the US.6 According to Andrew Johnston,
the City Code rules were designed to address common law’s incapability of
establishing a regulatory system under which takeovers viably assure managerial
accountability to shareholders – in particular, common law considered sales of
shareholdings as private matters with no implications for those outside the
contract, and so would not regulate equal treatment of shareholders in a changeof-control event.7 Others, such as Marco Ventoruzzo, call attention to (a) the
consequences of the typical dispersed ownership structures of listed companies
in the US and (b) the general efficiency of robust financial markets as central
reasons for the divergence.8 Finally, scholars like Ferrarini and Miller point to
the political forces operating at different geographical levels under different
conditions.9
There are indisputably fundamental differences between the market rule and
sharing rule systems – most prominent are differences in takeover dynamics and
market efficiency, in the behaviour of bidder and shareholders, in the discipline
of the board, in the protection of minority shareholders, and in the efficiency of
the market for corporate control. In this sense, any mandatory takeover
regulation implies a trade-off between the protection of non-controlling
shareholders and the efficiency of the market for corporate control. These
implications have been thoroughly discussed and debated, particularly in
42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 301 (2009); William Magnuson, Takeover Regulation in the United States and Europe:
An Institutional Approach, 21 PACE INT’L L. REV. 205 (2009); Grundmann supra note 3.
5 Lucian A Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, 87
VIRGINIA L. REV. 111 (2001) (explaining that there is wide support for introducing federal mandates in areas
such as takeover law and/or the powers of the board during hostile takeovers). See e.g. Samuel C Thompson Jr,
Change of Control Board: Federal Preemption of the Law Governing a Target’s Directors, 70 MISS. L.J. 35
(2000) (explaining that regulatory competition admittedly favours solutions in line with the interests of
management (the stakeholder that ultimately decides where to incorporate and where to remain incorporated),
and state takeover law has provided incumbent managers substantial protection from hostile takeovers).
6 John Armour & David A Skeel Jr, Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? The Peculiar
Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727 (2006). See also Magnuson supra note 4.
7 Andrew Johnston, Takeover Regulation: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the City Code, 66
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 422 (2007).
8 Ventoruzzo supra note 4 at 190-91.
9 Ferrarini & Miller supra note 4 at 334.
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European legal and economic literature during the decades preceding the
approval of the Takeover Directive.10
This paper does not intend to dive into the specificities of the two systems,
the reasons for the discrepancies, or the radically different economic effects of
each solution. It acknowledges that there is a gap with tremendous implications
between the American and European regulatory approaches to the MTR.
However, I wish to focus on the hybrid solution developed by Brazil, among
other jurisdictions: on many levels, this solution is quite distant from the letter
and the spirit of the European rule and, in practical terms, may even be slightly
closer to the dynamics of market rule jurisdictions. Because of the (limited)
harmonization effects of the Takeover Directive, EU Member States ceased to
apply hybrid solutions from 2004. By contrast, Brazil still has a hybrid
regulatory solution.11
Such hybrid solutions are interesting on different levels. First, looking at the
past, they make clear the historical context and the path dependence of each
regulatory solution. This is one of those cases where history indeed matters.
Second, looking at the future, such hybrid solutions are a relevant indicator of
how market forces are operating in that specific jurisdiction, showing us if the
regulation is stable or if it is being pushed in the direction of the market rule
system or the sharing rule system.
I will conclude that there are strong forces pushing the Brazilian regulatory
solution in the direction of the sharing rule system. To explain this trend, this
paper undertakes a comprehensive historical and critical analysis of the Brazilian
MTR, in part by comparing it against article 5º of the Takeover Directive. I argue
that in a context of low ownership concentration, the ineffectiveness of the
Brazilian MTR in article 254-A of the Lei das Sociedades por Ações (JointStock Companies Law) of 1976 (LSA) opened the door for aggressive selfregulation led by, and serving the interests of, incumbent blockholders. This
10 Erik Berglöf et al., European Takeover Regulation, 18 ECON. POL’Y 171 (2003); Guido Ferrarini, Share
Ownership, Takeover Law and the Contestability of Corporate Control, Paper prepared for Presentation at
Conference on Company Law Reform in OECD Countries: A Comparative Outlook of Current Trends (2000);
Luca Enriques, The Mandatory Bid Rule in the Takeover Directive: Harmonization Without Foundation?, 1
EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 440 (2004).
11 There are interesting papers comparing the diverse MTRs in the United Kingdom, the European Union
(under the Takeover Directive), and Brazil. Compare Erik Frederico Oioli, Oferta pública de aquisição do
controle de companhias abertas (2008) (Master’s dissertation, Universidade de São Paulo), and Pedro Testa,
The Mandatory Bid Rule in the European Community and in Brazil: A Critical View, (2006) (LL.M. dissertation,
the London School of Economics and Political Science), with Pedro Cordelli Alves, A oferta pública de
aquisição obrigatória nos ordenamentos jurídicos brasileiros e português, 7 DIREITO DAS SOCIEDADES EM
REVISTA 199 (2015).
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movement led to provisions that generally work as pure defences against hostile
takeovers, and not as proper, balanced responses to the MTR’s insufficiencies.
The result is that minority shareholders still lack protection; in fact, their position
is probably worse now than two decades ago.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the long and troubled
road of the MTR in the Takeover Directive, from its original roots in the 1972
version of the UK Takeover Code, and the 1974 Pennington Report, until its
final approval by the European Parliament in 2004. Section 3 does the same
exercise for the history of the MTR in Brazil, from the contemporaneous roots
of the preparation of the LSA to the approval of its 2001 revision that reinstated
the MTR. I will point out how the original roots of the MTR in the Takeover
Directive and in Brazilian regulations, dating back about half a century, have
dramatically impacted the solutions adopted today. Section 4 dives into the most
remarkable difference between the two regulations: whereas the MTR in the
directive is triggered by the acquisition of securities above a certain threshold of
voting rights, regardless of the cause of the acquisition, the Brazilian rule is
triggered only by a secondary transfer of a controlling stake, thus presupposing
– as was the case for most Brazilian listed companies until recently – that a
transfer of control depends on the agreement of the incumbent controlling
shareholder. Section 5 then describes the most important differences between
the systems concerning the price of the mandatory bid. Section 6 explores how
several companies listed on the Novo Mercado have recently used specific
provisions in the articles of associations to trigger the obligation for a mandatory
takeover bid, with thresholds usually set between 10% and 35% of voting shares.
Finally, Section 7 concludes.
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE MTR IN THE TAKEOVER DIRECTIVE
The MTR was first introduced in the UK in 1972 by the City Panel. 12 In
October 1971, Ozalid Company Limited announced a takeover of Venesta
International (and the shares of Keizer Venesta Limited not already owned by
12
THE
TAKEOVER
PANEL
(THE
PANEL
ON
TAKEOVERS
AND
MERGERS),
https://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/. The City Panel was established in 1968 as the entity in charge of
administering and enforcing the City Code. The Panel was a self-regulatory entity with no statutory authority.
This changed with the implementation of the Takeover Directive. Article 4(1) of the Directive stipulates that
‘Member States shall designate the authority or authorities competent to supervise bids for the purposes of the
rules which they make or introduce pursuant to this Directive. The authorities thus designated shall be either
public authorities, associations or private bodies recognized by national law or by public authorities expressly
empowered for that purpose by national law.’ Section 942 of the Companies Act 2006 confers certain statutory
powers to the Panel. See PAUL DAVIES & SARAH WORTHINGTON, GOWER’S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY
LAW 920-930 (Sweet & Maxwell, 10th ed. 2016).
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Venesta). The offer was partly in shares and partly in convertible unsecured
stock. The Venesta shares were valued at about 42p. The board of Venesta
advised shareholders to reject the offer, stating it was ‘far below the true value
of the group’. The price of Venesta shares rose on the stock market to over 50p.
In the meantime, company shareholder David Rowland started acquiring shares
in Venesta, privately purchasing a block of 1,000,000 shares at 55p per share. In
November, the rival bidder Norcros Limited announced its offers for Venesta
and Keizer’s equity, valuing the shares at approximately 52p. Following this
announcement, David Rowland (indirectly) acquired more shares in Venesta on
the market at prices ranging from 50p to 56p. While stating that he merely
intended to oppose the takeovers and preserve the value of his investment (which
he successfully did), such acquisitions granted him a controlling position in
Venesta without a takeover bid and without giving minority shareholders of
Venesta and Keizer the option to sell their shares on the more favourable terms
they would been offered had a rival bid succeeded.
The Takeover Panel analysed if rule 33 of the Code – intended to prevent the
frustration of a bona fide takeover by a third party – had been breached. It
concluded that the City Code ‘did not impose any obligation on an individual
who has acquired control by a series of purchases in the market to endeavour to
obtain the remaining shares. Under the 1968 version of the Code, the Panel had
enforced rules 10 and 26 – envisaging sales of controlling stakes by directors
and partial bids – to require those acquiring significant blocks of shares to make
an offer to the remaining shareholders. It became clear, however, that this was
insufficient, requiring the Panel to determine in each case if ‘effective control’
was transferred, which involved assessing factors such as the company’s
ownership structure and the level of shareholder involvement.13 Conversely, it
became clear that creeping acquisitions of shares through market purchases and
bilateral share purchase agreements could have the effect of frustrating the fair
expectations of minority shareholders, and that the 1968 rules would only apply
upon a transfer of control from an existing controlling shareholder (a secondary
transfer of control). Following the takeovers of Venesta and Keizer, the Panel
approved the first version of the MTR: a new rule 35, requiring any person who
purchases 40% or more of a listed company’s shares to bid for the remaining
shares; and a new rule 34, concerning the acquisition of significant holdings

13 Panel Statement, The Takeover Panel, The Consolidated Signal Company Limited/Venesta International
Limited (Jan. 6, 1972), https://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/1972-01.pdf;
Johnston, supra note 7; Armour & Skeel Jr, supra note 6 at 1763–1764; Ferna Ipekel, A Comparative Study of
Takeover Regulation in the UK and France 154 (Aug. 2004) (Ph.D. thesis, London School of Economics and
Political Science).
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from directors or a limited number of sellers. The threshold of rule 35 was
lowered to 30% in 1974,14 where it still stands.15
The functionality underlying the MTR remains essentially the same as in the
1972 version of the City Code and is based on two fundamental premises. First,
all shareholders should be given an option to sell out – an exit option – on
favourable terms if a new controlling shareholder emerges (regardless of
whether this results from a secondary transfer of control). 16 Second, if any
control premium is paid, it must be proportionally shared by all shareholders.
The current version of article 9.1 of the Code states:
Except with the consent of the Panel, when: (a) any person acquires,
whether by a series of transactions over a period of time or not, an
interest in shares which (taken together with shares in which persons
acting in concert with that person are interested) carry 30% or more of
the voting rights of a company; or (b) any person, together with persons
acting in concert with that person, is interested in shares which in the
aggregate carry not less than 30% of the voting rights of a company
but does not hold shares carrying more than 50% of such voting rights
and such person, or any person acting in concert with that person,
acquires an interest in any other shares which increases the percentage
of shares carrying voting rights in which that person is interested, such
person shall extend offers, on the basis set out in rules 9.3 and 9.5, to
the holders of any class of equity share capital whether voting or nonvoting and also to the holders of any other class of transferable
securities carrying voting rights. Offers for different classes of equity
share capital must be comparable; the Panel should be consulted in
advance in such cases.17

The influence of the UK legal system on the Takeover Directive and on the
MTR is unequivocal. Gelter and Reif call the Takeover Directive a ‘watered-

14 Proposals made in 1989 and 1992 to reduce the 30% threshold were both rejected: see Panel Statement
of 26 June 1989 on the Report of a Panel Working Party on Takeover Rules and Practices; Ipkel, supra note 13
at 157.
15 The 1974 revision went deeper. First, it replaced the old rules 34 and 35 with one set of requirements,
eliminating the distinction between selective purchases and market purchases; second, it established the 30%
threshold as ‘effective control’ for Code purposes in virtually all circumstances. See Johnston, supra note 7 at
445; see also Ipkel, supra note 13 at 155–156 (comprehensively describing the 1972 and 1974 versions).
16 The explanation for article 35 in the 1971/72 Report of the Takeover Panel is very clear on this: the rule
‘brings within the scope of the Code any series of purchases (or other acquisitions) of shares, however gradual,
which brings about a change of effective control’.
17 The Takeover Panel (The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers), The Takeover Code, (12th ed. 2016),
https://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf.
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down version of UK takeover law’.18 Others, like Venturozzo, make the
important point that the influence of the UK system is also indirect, since several
continental European systems adopted the British approach before this was
required by the EU.19 In fact, this regulatory inspiration is one of the few
coherent features throughout the long, troubled and embarrassing 20 approval
process of the Takeover Directive, from the 1974 draft to its final approval by
the European Parliament in April 2004.
Attempts to harmonize takeover regulation in Europe began in 1974, when a
first draft proposal for a directive was presented. At that time, requiring an entity
to launch a general offer to acquire all outstanding shares following the
acquisition of a certain number of shares was not exclusive to the English legal
system; however, it was far from a generally accepted principle. This first draft
was based on the ‘Pennington Report’,21 an appraisal of takeover regulation
authored by UK company law expert Professor Robert Pennington, at the
instigation of the European Commission. Unsurprisingly, this report reflected
the then-dominant perspectives of UK corporate law, particularly because
London was home to the most important stock exchange in Europe and the
reference for takeovers experience. After 1953, the number and complexity of
takeover bids in the UK led to special attention from regulators, aiming to
discipline tenders and protect minority shareholders. The focus of regulation and
litigation was defensive measures taken by boards. Only in the 1970s and 1980s
did other countries follow this path.
With the focus on abuse prevention, equal treatment of shareholders, and
protection of minority shareholders, the draft proposal was directly influenced
by the recent UK experience concerning the MTR and the recently approved
revision of the Takeover Code (1972). As the Pennington Report stated,
‘inevitably abuses and unfair practices have occurred in connection with
takeover bids, and national legislation in some of the Member States of the
European Communities and professional rules and codes of conduct in others
18 Martin Gelter & Alexandra M. Reif, What Is Dead May Never Die: The UK’s Influence on EU Company
Law, 40 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1413 (2017).
19 Marco Ventoruzzo, Takeover Regulation as a Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Taking UK Rules to Continental
Europe, 11 J. BUS. L. 135 (2008). It is generally stated that, in the 1980s, several continental European countries
followed the City Code as the regulatory benchmark. See also Marc Goergen, et al., Corporate Governance
Convergence: Evidence from Takeover Regulation Reforms in Europe, 21 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL’Y 243
(2005); Klaus J Hopt, Common Principles of Corporate Governance in Europe, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
REGIMES: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY 178-181 (Joseph McCahery et al., eds., 2002).
20 EILÍS FERRAN, BUILDING AN EU SECURITIES MARKET 117-118 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004).
21 Commission Report of the Directorate-General for Internal Market on Takeover and Other Bids
XI/56/74-E (1974), retrieved from http://aei.pitt.edu/33743/1/A304_1.pdf.
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have been devised to counter them’. Article 7 of the 1974 draft regulated the
‘obligation to make a general offer’, stating that an entity must make a general
offer to acquire all voting securities if that entity (a) holds securities entitling the
holders to exercise at least 40% of the voting rights; (b) has within the preceding
12 months acquired securities entitling the holders to exercise at least 20% of
the voting rights; or (c) ‘enters into an agreement to acquire securities of the
other company which, when added to the securities already held by that person
or body of persons, will entitle their holders to exercise voting control over the
other company’.
The Pennington Report and the draft directive did not receive the support
required to continue the legislative process. This reflects that takeover regulation
was not considered necessary in most continental jurisdictions in the late 1970s
and the 1980s, as there were virtually no takeovers outside the UK. 22 After a
couple of years, interest in the project was lost.
Only in the mid-1980s did the European Commission reenergize the
initiative. The catalyst was the Commission’s 1985 white paper ‘Completing the
Internal Market’, which included general remarks concerning takeovers. The
most important ones were as follows:
There is a case, however, for making better use of certain procedures
such as offers of shares to the public for reshaping the pattern of share
ownership in enterprises, since the rules currently in force in this
sphere vary a great deal from one country to another. Such operations
should be made more attractive. This could be done by requiring
minimum guarantees, particularly on the information to be given to
those concerned, while it would be left to the Member State to devise
procedures for monitoring such operations and to designate the
authorities to which the powers of supervision were to be assigned.
(paragraph 139º)
In order to adapt Community obligations to changes in financial
techniques and so improve the arrangements for operations which have
grown substantially in importance. Action will have to be taken at
Community level to liberalize operations such as the issue, placing and
acquisition of securities representing risk capital, transactions in
securities issued by Community institutions and long-term commercial
credit. (paragraph 141º)

22 See Robert R Pennington, Takeover Bids in the United Kingdom, 17 AM. J. OF COMPAR. L. 159 (1969);
Johnston, supra note 7 at 422-460; Armour & Skeel Jr, supra note 6 at 1727-1794; Rolf Skog, The Takeover
Directive–An Endless Saga?, 13 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 301 (2002); Berglöf et al., supra note 10.
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At the end of the white paper, the Commission announced its intention to
propose a directive governing takeover activity. 23
In 1989, the European Commission presented its first draft proposal for a
Thirteenth Directive on company law concerning takeover and other general
bids.24 This proposal was revised in September 1990 to reflect the opinions of
the Economic and Social Committee and the European Parliament. Regarding
the MTR, article 4º of the 1989 proposal – still in line with the City Code –
stipulated that ‘any person aiming to acquire a number or percentage of
securities, which, added to any existing holdings, gives him a percentage of the
voting rights in a company which may not be fixed at more than 33%, shall be
obliged to make a bid to acquire all the securities of that company’. The amended
1990 proposal25 kept the same principles, although it differed on several minor
technical issues: ‘any person (‘the acquirer’) who as a result of acquisition by
himself or by a person referred to in paragraph 2 holds securities which added
to any existing holdings give him a percentage of the voting rights in a company
which may not be fixed at more than one-third of the voting rights existing at
the date of acquisition shall be obliged to make a bid to acquire all the securities
of the company’.
The proposal faced strong opposition from certain Member States, with the
UK particularly vocal in opposing it. Even though the draft directive was mostly
inspired by the City Code, the UK government feared that its approval would
force the United Kingdom to abandon the self-regulation system, replacing it
with a ‘statutory’ form of regulation that would compromise the special position
of the Takeover Panel.
Even though takeover bids were mostly concentrated in the UK, in the late
1980s and early 1990s the phenomenon was rapidly spreading in continental
Europe, after the hostile takeover of Société Générale de Belgique in 1988, 26
Schneider’s takeover of Télémecanique27 and Banco de Bilbao’s attempted
takeover of Banco Español de Credito (Banesto). Europe was not a regulatory
level playing field: while some jurisdictions ignored takeover regulation
23 Commission
White Paper on Completing the Internal Market (June 14, 1985),
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/4ff490f3-dbb6-4331-a2ea-a3ca59f974a8/language-en;
Dmitry Tuchinsky, The Takeover Directive and Inspire Art: Reevaluating the European Union’s Market for
Corporate Control in the New Millennium, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 689 (2006-2007).
24 Official Journal of the European Communities, 27.11.1989.
25 Official Journal of the European Communities, 26. 9. 1990.
26 Dominique Barjot, OPA sur la Générale de Belgique (1988), REVUE FRANCAISE D’HISTOIRE
ECONOMIQUE 178 (2021) (Fr.).
27 Michel Quere, French Poison Pills and Take-over Restrictions, 7 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 8 (1988).
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(Denmark and Greece), others approved high-level regulation (France, Spain,
and Portugal), and still others approved codes of conduct (the UK, Germany,
and the Netherlands).28 The Commission indicated in 1992 that it was planning
to revise its proposal.29
Only in February 1996 was a new proposal for a Thirteenth Directive on
company law concerning takeover bids presented.30 It was finally adopted by the
European Commission in 1997. This proposal was less detailed and attempted a
lower level of harmonization to handle the opposition of different Member
States. It is often referred to as a ‘framework’ directive, with five general
principles that Member States would have to follow. Concerning the MTR,
article 3º stipulated:
where a natural person or legal entity who as a result of acquisition,
holds securities which added to any existing holdings give him a
specified percentage of voting rights in a company referred to in
Article 1, conferring on him the control of that company, Member
States should ensure that rules or other mechanisms or arrangements
are in force which either oblige this person to make a bid in accordance
with Article 10º or offer other appropriate and at least equivalent
means in order to protect the minority shareholders of that company.31

Meanwhile, article 10º stipulated:
Where a Member State provides for a mandatory bid as a means to
protect the minority shareholders, this bid shall be launched to all
shareholders for all or for a substantial part of their holdings at a price
which meets the objective of protecting their interests. If the
mandatory bid comprises only a part of the securities of the offeree
company and the shareholders offer to sell to the offeror more shares
than the partial offer covers, shareholders should be treated equally by
means of a pro rata treatment of their shareholdings.

As explained in the proposal’s introduction,
28 Corporate Governance in Europe: Report of a CEPS Working Party. No. 9290791942(1995); Skog,
supra note 22. See also Nathalie Basaldua, Towards the Harmonization of EC-Member States’ Regulations on
Takeover Bids: The Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law, 9 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS.
487 (1989); Tuchinsky, supra at note 23; Rolf Skog, The European Union’s Proposed Takeover Directive, the
“Breakthrough” Rule and the Swedish System of Dual Class Common Stock, 15 Eur. Bus. L. Rev. 1439 (2004).
29 Conclusions
of
the
Presidency
(EC)
SN
456/1/92
(Dec.
12,
1992),
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20492/1992_december_-_edinburgh__eng_.pdf.
30 Official Journal of the European Communities, 6.6.1996.
31 Equivalent means of protecting minority shareholders included the procedure de garantie de cours (or
mantien de cours), traditionally regulated in France as an alternative to the MTR and deeply revised in 1992.
See ALAIN VIANDIER, OPA, OPE, GARANTIE DE COURS, RETRAIT, OPV – DROIT DES OFFRES PUBLIQUES 311–
348 (Litec, 2d ed. 1993).
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Member States should take the necessary steps in order to protect
shareholders having minority holdings after the purchase of the control
of their company; whereas such a protection can be ensured either by
obliging the person who acquired the control of a company to make a
bid to all shareholders for all or for a substantial part of their holdings
or by providing for other means which attain the objective of at least
an equivalent level of protection of minority shareholders.

The principle and regulatory structure of the MTR were, thus, left untouched.
The proposal was once again rejected by Member States, leading to revisions
by the European Commission at the end of 1997. Article 3º was again left
untouched: Member States should ensure that rules are in force which set certain
voting-share thresholds beyond which a shareholder must bid in accordance with
article 10º or offer other equivalent means to protect the minority shareholders
of that company. In July 2001 the proposal was finally put to a vote in the
European Parliament; surprisingly, it was rejected32 (273 votes for and 273
against).
The MTR, albeit lacking consensus, was not central to the division.
Parliament’s decision is usually attributed to three main reasons. First, there was
disagreement over whether a board of directors should be entitled to adopt
defensive measures; in particular, Germany did not accept the European
Council’s restrictive stance on the use of defensive measures.33 Second,
employee protection caused division. Third, there was disagreement over
restricting multiple voting rights (and equivalent structures) in case of a
takeover. Notably, the revised proposal kept the MTR wording untouched but
made optional for Member States and companies the two most contentious
directive provisions: article 9º (takeover defences) and article 11 (the
breakthrough rule, which neutralized certain pre-bid defences during a takeover
and allowed a successful offeror to remove the offeree’s incumbent board and
modify its bylaws).34
In July 2001, shortly after the European Parliament vote, the European
Commission appointed a High-Level Group of Company Law Experts, led by
Professor Jaap Winter, to present two reports: on European takeover regulation
and on a modern regulatory framework for company law in the EU. The takeover

32 Only once previously had the European Parliament rejected a conciliation agreement. See Skog, supra
note 28.
33 Ferran, supra note 20 at 110.
34 See Tuchinsky, supra at note 23; Thomas Papadopoulos, The Mandatory Provisions of the EU Takeover
Bid Directive and Their Deficiencies, 1 LAW & FIN. MARKETS REV. 525 (2007); Skog, supra note 28.
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regulation report was presented in July 200235 and made several influential (and
some controversial) recommendations covering matters such as the equitable
price to be offered in mandatory bids, the availability of squeeze-out
mechanisms and sell-out rights after a takeover bid, and the (then) central issue
of proportionality between risk-bearing capital and control. Notably, the report
did not question if an MTR is the best solution: this debate was not running at
that time, and the report lacked economic analysis.
In October 2002, the European Commission submitted a revised proposal for
the Takeover Directive, which was finally approved on 30 March 2004.
Concerning the MTR, article 5.1 kept the same basic principles:
Where a natural or legal person, as a result of his/her own acquisition
or the acquisition by persons acting in concert with him/her, holds
securities of a company as referred to in Article 1(1) which, added to
any existing holdings of those securities of his/hers and the holdings
of those securities of persons acting in concert with him/her, directly
or indirectly give him/her a specified percentage of voting rights in that
company, giving him/her control of that company, Member States
shall ensure that such a person is required to make a bid as a means of
protecting the minority shareholders of that company. Such a bid shall
be addressed at the earliest opportunity to all the holders of those
securities for all their holdings at the equitable price as defined in
paragraph 4.

The existence of an MTR is not optional for EU Member States (or for listed
companies),36 even though there is a strong margin for fluctuation of national
regimes. First, Member States retain the power to determine the relevant
threshold of voting rights triggering the MTR (generally established at 30% or
33%) and to specify the calculation method. Second, they are entitled to establish
exceptions to the rule. According to article 4(5),
provided that the general principles laid down in Article 3(1) are
respected, Member States may provide in the rules that they make or
introduce pursuant to this directive for derogations from those rules:
(i) by including such derogations in their national rules, in order to take
35 Jaap W. Winter et al., Report of the High-Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to
Takeover Bids in the European Union, in REFORMING COMPANY AND TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE 825-924
(Guido Ferrarini et al., eds. Oxford Univ. Press 2004).
36 The MTR had been adopted across most Member States by 2004, with few exceptions; some had to
amend the rule to transpose the Directive. See Goergen, et al., supra note 19 at 23; Harald Baum, Change of
Governance in Historic Perspective: The German Experience (European Corporate Governance Institute,
Working Paper No. 28, 2005), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=695741; CHRISTOPHE
CLERC, ET AL., A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF EUROPEAN TAKEOVER REGULATION 55 (Center for
European Policy Studies (CEPS) Paperbacks, 2012).
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account of circumstances determined at national level and/or (ii) by
granting their supervisory authorities, where they are competent,
powers to waive such national rules, to take account of the
circumstances referred to in (i) or in other specific circumstances, in
which case a reasoned decision must be required.

Also, the Takeover Directive only provides for one explicit derogation from
the MTR (when the threshold is crossed following a 100% bid), but most
Member States have established a broad set of derogations. In its 2012 report on
the application of the directive, the European Commission points out that the
wide range of national derogations to the MTR raises the question of whether
the rule adequately protects minority shareholders in change-of-control
situations.37
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE MTR IN THE BRAZILIAN LSA
In Brazil, the debate concerning entitlement to the control premium
originates in the preparation of the LSA (Lei 6.404 of 15 December 1976). The
previous law – Decreto-Lei nº 2.627 of 26 September 1940 – made no reference
to entitlement to the control premium and did not in fact regulate the legal
position of controlling shareholders38 Indeed, until 1882, most of the companies
incorporated in Brazil were subject to voting-rights ceilings as a condition for
incorporation; in the following years, when the ‘one share, one vote’ rule became
dominant, few companies had a controlling shareholder.39
In 1974, two years before the LSA was enacted, the Brazilian government
gave two powerful indications of its intention to approve a premium-sharing
solution through revising the law. The Second National Development Plan40
stated that regulatory revision should ‘prevent that the market value of the
minority shareholders’ shares is lower than those of the majority shareholder’

37 See Report of the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the
Application
of
Directive
2004/25/EC
on
takeover
bids,
at
6
(June
28,
2012),
http://www.cdep.ro/afaceri_europene/CE/2012/COM_2012_347_EN_ACTE_f.pdf. Admittedly, this power to
establish MTR exemptions gives Member States a wide range of discretion. See Enriques, supra note 10 at 443–
446; Papadopoulos, supra note 34 at 526–527.
38 ALFREDO LAMY FILHO & JOSÉ LUIZ BULHÕES PEDREIRA, A LEI DAS S.A 119-120 (Renovar 1992).
39 See Mariana Pargendler, Cinco mitos sobre a história das sociedades anônimas no Brasil, 119 HARVARD
LAW REVIEW (2006); OIOLI. 2010, 53–56. For a thorough and complete description of the legislative process of
the LSA, see Lamy Filho & Pedreira, supra note 38.
40 Lei nº 6.151 of 4 December 1974. The Second National Development Plan (1975–1979) was a general
economic plan approved by the government in accordance with the Brazilian Constitution. See Lamy Filho &
Pedreira, supra note 38 at 125–130; Nelson Laks Eizirik, The Role of the State in the Regulation of the Securities
Markets: The Brazilian Experience, 1 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 211 (1978).
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and should consider ‘the Government’s concern that minority shareholders
should have reinforced protection vis-à-vis controlling shareholders’.41
Moreover, the Council for Economic Development (CDE) approved a
recommendation that, in revising Decreto-Lei nº 2.627 of 1940, the legislator
should approve ‘a solution that does not allow that each share of the controlling
shareholder has a potential value much higher than those of the minority
shareholders’.
Opposing the signals emerging from governmental entities, the two
professors who drafted the 1976 reform – José Luiz Bulhões Pedreira and
Alfredo Lamy Filho – opined that the control premium belonged to the
controlling shareholder; accordingly, they believed there was no reason to share
that control premium among all shareholders in a listed company. This stance
was reflected in the solution adopted in the draft bill. According to the
explanatory memorandum of the LSA from the Finance Ministry to the President
of the Republic (Exposição de Motivos nº 196 of 24 June 1976), the draft bill
was prepared in accordance with the principles of the President-approved CDE
document (June 1974) yet states that the control premium belongs to the
controlling shareholder (Section VI).42
The two respected professors drew a clear line between ‘controlling
shareholders’ and ‘speculative investors’. They described controlling
shareholders as ‘the real entrepreneurs, the ones that create wealth and that,
because of their power in the economic world, have duties to the community,
the minority shareholders, the company and all the employees’. By contrast, they
described speculative investors as:
the ones that buy shares in the market with the intention of selling them
as soon as they can make a profit, exclusively motivated by their
expectation about the future evolution of the stock prices or by
information, real or false, spread out in the market, often with the
intention of manipulation. 43

41
See MODESTO CARVALHOSA, OFERTA PÚBLICA DE AQUISIÇÃO DE AÇÕES § 7 118-120 (Ibmec 1979);
FÁBIO KONDER COMPARATO & C ALIXTO SALOMÃO FILHO, O PODER DE CONTROLE NA SOCIEDADE ANÔNIMA 271
(Forense 2014); LAURA FALLACE RONCA ANGRISANI, ALIENAÇÃO DE CONTROLO ACIONÁRIO 14 (PUC 2015).
42 Id.
43 Lamy Filho & Pedreira, supra note 38 at 157 and 162. This dichotomy between the controlling
shareholder – accountable for his actions and responsible for the board composition – and minority shareholders
– uninterested in the life of the company and mere lenders of capital – was described in Alfredo Lamy Filho, A
reforma da lei de sociedades anônimas, REVISTA FORENSE 142 (1972). See also Laks Eizirik, supra note 40 at
214–216; ERIK FREDERICO OIOLI, REGIME JURÍDICO DO CAPITAL DISPERSO NA LEI DAS SA 300-301 (Almedina
2019).
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For controlling shareholders, the LSA structured a framework incentivizing
the formation of groups controlled by a shareholder (or group of shareholders)
holding the controlling power and corresponding responsibility.44 Appropriation
of the control premium by the controlling shareholder should be regarded as
compensation for the responsibilities intrinsic to the controlling position. For
speculative investors, the LSA opened the doors for the issuance of preferential
non-voting shares as a preferential security for stock exchange listing.
Unsurprisingly, in a 2000 study on the structure of ownership and control of
325 companies listed on the São Paulo Stock Exchange, the findings revealed a
very high degree of ownership concentration (62% of companies had one
shareholder owning over 50% of voting shares); a very high proportion (89%)
of companies issuing non-voting shares;45 on average, only 54% of a company’s
equity capital was voting capital.46
The draft bill stated clearly that there was no justification to share the control
premium among all shareholders: (a) as a rule, the transfer of control is not
damaging to minority shareholders; (b) although there is economic value in the
controlling position, this value belongs to the shareholders who control the
company, so they are entitled to receive a premium reflecting this value; (c) the

44

See LSA, articles 243º to 250º, 265º to 279º, 116º and 117º.
Unlike in most equity markets, voting shares have been traded at a discount relative to non-voting shares
for many years in Brazil, according to empirical studies. See Richard Saito & Alexandre Di Miceli da Silveira,
The Relevance of Tag Along Rights and Identity of Controlling Shareholders for the Price Spreads between
Dual-Class Shares: The Brazilian Case, 7 BRAZILIAN ADMIN. REV. 1 (2010); Richard Saito, Determinants of
the Differential Pricing between Voting and Non-Voting Shares in Brazil’, 23 BRAZILIAN REV. ECONOMETRICS
(2003). These findings are partly explained by liquidity/sample reasons and the relative valuation of the
preferential dividend vis-à-vis voting rights.
46 Sílvia Mourthé Valadares & Ricardo PC Leal, Ownership and control structure of Brazilian companies,
AVAILABLE AT SSRN 213409 (2000); Oioli, supra note 43 at 47–52; Comparato & Salomão Filho, supra note
41 at 63-65. For a list of other empirical studies of ownership concentration in Brazil between 1985 and 2002,
see Oioli, supra note 11 at 56–58. This panorama is changing, and ownership concentration declined recently,
notably in the Novo Mercado: at the most demanding listing level, requirements include (for example) the listing
of voting shares with a ‘one share, one vote’ ruling and dispersing at least 25% of listed shares. A company
listed in these market segments must comply with BM&FBovespa’s set of corporate governance practices. See
Érica Gorga, Changing the Paradigm of Stock Ownership from Concentrated towards Dispersed Ownership:
Evidence from Brazil and Consequences for Emerging Countries, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS 439 (2009); Érica
Gorga, Corporate Control and Governance after a Decade from ‘Novo Mercado’: Changes in Ownership
Structures and shareholder power in Brazil, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER (2015), 1–2;
Antonio Gledson De Carvalho & George G Pennacchi, Can a stock exchange improve corporate behavior?
Evidence from firms’ migration to premium listings in Brazil, 18 JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE (2012);
Oioli, supra note 11 at 58–68; Eduardo Secchi Munhoz, Transferência de controle nas companhias sem
controlador majoritário, in PODER DE CONTROLE E OUTROS TEMAS DE DIREITO SOCIETÁRIO E MERCADO DE
CAPITAIS 289–293 (SÃO PAULO: QUARTIER LATIN 2010).
45
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controlling position of the controlling shareholder implies
responsibilities. This was the solution adopted in the draft bill.
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This opinion was controversial from the beginning of the legislative process.
During the legislative discussions, Modesto Carvalhosa stated in Congress that
the draft bill clearly lacked a rule establishing the right of minority shareholders
to participate in a transfer of control.47 Later, Carvalhosa stated that the nonexistence of a rule protecting minority shareholders in a sale of control was a
‘perplexity’. Although the original draft bill did not regulate the transfer of
control of listed companies, it did cover companies subject to government
approval (article 255º) and stated a general principle of equal treatment of all
shareholders (article 255º). This might be considered incoherent but can be
understood as reflecting historical abusive and controversial ownership transfers
in the banking sector (companies subject to government approval).48
The draft bill was subject to lively debate in both Congress and the Senate.
This debate featured three interrelated perspectives: the unquestionable fact that
the draft bill was misaligned with previous guidelines approved by the Brazilian
government (the 1974 Recommendation of the CDE and the Second National
Development Plan); the doctrinal dispute concerning the social or individual
property of the control premium; and public opinion on the scandalously unfair
treatment of minority shareholders in many M&A transactions (particularly
involving banks) in the late 1960s and the 1970s.49 In Congress, two
amendments were proposed to article 254º of the LSA, intending to guarantee
equality of treatment between all shareholders; however, they were both rejected
in the final vote. In the Senate, the amendment proposed by Senator Otto
Lehmann was finally approved, giving the Conselho Monetário Nacional
(National Monetary Council; hereafter ‘CMN’) responsibility for establishing
47 Admittedly, the most important issues he raised concerned the ‘denationalization’ of Brazilian
companies and the institutionalization of a model of finance capitalism directed by the banks. Laks Eizirik, supra
note 40 at 213.
48 Lamy Filho & Pedreira, supra note 38 at 178–183; MODESTO CARVALHOSA, A NOVA LEI DAS
SOCIEDADES ANÔNIMAS: SEU MODELO ECONÔMICO 120 (Saraiva 1976); CARVALHOSA, OFERTA PÚBLICA DE
AQUISIÇÃO DE AÇÕES 119 (Ibmec 1979). Oioli, supra note 43 at 306; Carlos Augusto da Silveira Lobo, Alienação
do Controle de Companhia Aberta, in DIREITO DAS COMPANHIAS II 2006–2007 (2009).
49 Such concentrations happened in many areas but mainly in the banking sector; in many cases,
transactions were sponsored by the government and regulators. It should be noted that 1971, following the years
of the ‘Brazilian miracle’, saw unprecedented speculation in the Brazilian stock exchanges: for the 85 most
liquid shares in the Rio de Janeiro stock exchange, the average price increase in the first semester of 1971 was
230%. However, this was followed later that year by a long winter of decreasing stock prices. See Lamy Filho
& Pedreira, supra note 38 at 135–136; Comparato & Salomão Filho, supra note 41 at 232-236; Carvalhosa,
supra note 48 at 112–114; Lobo, supra note 48; ALFREDO LAMY FILHO & JOSÉ LUIZ BULHÕES PEDREIRA,
DIREITO DAS COMPANHIAS 2005-2006 (Forense 2009).
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the rules for any offer to sell control of a public company, and granting the
Comissão dos Valores Mobiliários (Securities and Exchange Commission;
hereafter ‘CVM’) the power to ensure ‘minority shareholders would be granted
equal treatment’ in the transfer of control of a public company. 50
After the ‘Lehman amendment’, article 254º of the LSA stated:
The sale of control of a public company depends on the prior approval of the
Securities Commission.
§ 1º The Securities Commission guarantees minority shareholders are
treated equally with the simultaneous offer to buy the shares;
§ 2º If the number of offered shares, including the shares of the
controlling or majority shareholders, is higher than those contemplated
by the offer, they will be proportionally apportioned in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the public offer;
§ 3º It will be the responsibility of the National Monetary Council to
establish the rules of any offer to sell the control of a public company.

After the draft bill’s approval, Lamy Filho and Bulhões Pedreira wrote to the
Minister of Finance, Mário Henrique Simonsen, to comment on the amendments
introduced by Congress and the Senate. Concerning the Lehman amendment,
the two professors restated the position they originally advanced in the draft bill,
maintained the opinion that sharing the control premium would drastically limit
the property rights of controlling shareholders, and argued that the new rule
would (a) negatively impact on the decision to list companies in the stock
exchange and to acquire control of a listed company, and (b) create an imperfect
solution that would provoke artificial responses by the market.51
The new article 254º of the LSA (sale of control of a public company)
transposed the wording of the pre-existing article 255º (sale of control of a
company subject to government approval).52 This appropriation of the
mechanics and wording of article 255º in the new article 254º had regulatory
consequences whose effects are still felt today. First, article 255º was strictly
activated by a bilateral sale of control agreement – a transaction by which the

50 Jorge Lobo, Interpretação realista da alienação de controle de companhia aberta, REVISTA DA EMERJ
45-46 (2001).
51 See Lamy Filho & Pedreira, supra note 38 at 277–283.
52 In the draft bill presented to Congress, article 255º regulated the transparency requirements for a sale of
control of a public company, article 256º regulated the sale of control of a public company subject to government
approval, and article 257º required that the shareholders’ meeting approved transactions in certain sales of
control of a public company. Articles 255º to 257º of the draft bill became articles 254º to 256º of the LSA.
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controlling shareholder of a company subject to government approval
transferred the controlling block to a buyer. These mechanics were replicated in
article 254º, making the MTR also dependent on such a transaction. 53 Second,
the wording of article 255º was unclear in many ways, the best example being
the legal treatment of non-voting shares; this would not be a material problem
for companies subject to government approval, but was definitively problematic
for listed companies. Third, this transposition created the idea that control of
listed companies could only be acquired with authorization from the CVM.
Under article 255º, the sale of control of a public company subject to government
approval was conditional upon the approval of the respective governmental
agency. This solution was coherent given the regulated activity performed by
the company. In accordance with the new article 254º, the sale of control of a
public/listed company became dependent on the prior approval of the CVM;
however, in accordance with § 1º, intervention by the CVM was strictly intended
to guarantee that minority shareholders were treated equally through the
simultaneous offer to buy their shares.
The intervention of public agencies, particularly the CVM, was also
controversial. ABRASCA (https://www.abrasca.org.br/), a private association
of listed companies, led a movement seeking the political veto of article 254º of
the LSA by the President of the Republic. This was motivated by fear of the
government being empowered to approve or disapprove sales of shares, which
would be a severe intervention in the markets. The President decided not to veto
the rule but promised this issue would be clarified in the resolution of the CMN,
as eventually happened. The meaning of the CVM authorization was clarified
with the approval of Resolution 401/76 of the CMN:
I – the sale of control of a public company can only be agreed subject
to the condition, precedent or subsequent, that the entity that acquires
control has the obligation to present, under the terms of this
Resolution, a mandatory offer for all voting shares of the remaining
shareholders of the company, in order to guarantee equal treatment visà-vis the controlling shareholder.

This resolution was enacted under § 3 of article 254 of the LSA (‘it will be
the responsibility of the National Monetary Council to establish the rules of any
offer to sell the control of a public company’), and it clarified the requirement
for authorization from the CVM. In many ways, however, it went beyond the
LSA. The best example is the restriction of the offer to ‘voting shares’: no such
restriction is expressly contemplated by the LSA, yet it is still in force today.
53

Lamy Filho & Pedreira, supra note 38 at 692–696.
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Article 254º of the LSA remained in force in Brazil for almost two decades.
In May 1997, Law nº 9.457 revised the LSA and revoked the existing MTR. The
contents of Law n.º 9.457 provide little explanation for this revocation. The
explanation of António Kandir, the representative of Congress who authored the
proposal, is as follows:
the mandatory takeover rule produces the worst of both worlds. At the
same time, it inhibits and complicates the transactions for transfer of
control that are required for healthy companies and is harmful for
minority shareholders, since an unhealthy company will cause the loss
of value of their shares which is a problem, first, for minority
shareholders.

It seems clear that there may have been other reasons behind the 1997
reform. The Brazilian federal government intended to privatize many stateowned companies, which placed it in the position of seller of control with respect
to the premium-sharing rule. Revoking article 254º of the LSA thus enabled the
government to transfer control of such companies without sharing the control
premium.54
Four years later, Law nº 10.303 of 31 October 2001 further revised the LSA
by, inter alia, introducing the MTR currently in force in Brazil. Specifically,
article 254-A states that (a) the sale of the controlling position in a public
company is subject to the condition of launching an offer to buy the remaining
voting shares; (b) in such an offer, the minimum price to be paid to outstanding
shareholders equals 80% of the price paid for the controlling position; (c) the
sale of a controlling position is the transfer, directly or indirectly, of a controlling
stake or of shares related to a shareholders’ agreement, convertible securities, or
sales of warrants (that may cause the sale of the controlling position); (d) the
CVM will authorize the sale of a controlling position if the legal terms and
conditions of a mandatory public bid are met; (e) the CVM is responsible for
establishing the rules on offers to sell control of a public company; (f) the
acquirer of the controlling position may offer minority shareholders the option
to remain shareholders, paying them a premium equivalent to the difference
between the market price of the shares and the price paid to the selling
controlling shareholder.

54

NELSON EIZIRIK, A LEI DAS S/A COMENTADA § III 420 (Quartier Latin 2011).
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III. THE MTR AS A MERE PREMIUM-SHARING RULE AND (ALSO) AS AN EXIT
RULE
The UK approach has historically been the most extreme form of MTR,
effectively preventing the acquisition of a controlling position in a listed
company without sharing any control premium (assuming such premium exists).
First, it envisages transfer of control transactions and scenarios in which
someone obtains a controlling position where none previously existed: the
trigger for the obligation strictly depends on the accumulation of voting shares
above a certain threshold. Second, the rule does not contemplate a price discount
for minority non-controlling shareholders and effectively extends to all
shareholders (at least) the same terms and conditions agreed with the controlling
shareholder. Third, the rule does not allow restrictions on the quantity of
outstanding shares for which the offer must be extended: a general offer must be
made to buy all remaining shares.
This is the approach directly adopted by the Takeover Directive.55 Under
article 5(1) of the Takeover Directive, the mandatory bid is triggered by the
acquisition by the bidder, or by entities acting in concert with them, of securities
above a certain threshold of voting rights. It is irrelevant whether the new
controlling shareholder acquired the controlling position from a former
controlling shareholder or instead built a controlling position that did not exist
before. The same rule mandates extension of the bid ‘to all the holders of those
securities for all their holdings’, but not for partial voluntary bids below the
MTR threshold. However, Member States are free to prohibit partial offers or to
allow them only in certain conditions.56 Finally, the offer must be presented at
the equitable price defined in article 5(4).
The Brazilian rule has a completely different approach: the MTR is only
triggered by secondary transfers of a controlling stake (thus presupposing that a
controlling shareholder transfers its controlling stake to a new controlling
shareholder), and so is not triggered by a specific threshold of voting rights.
Since its first version, with the Lehman amendment, the scope of the MTR in
55 Before the directive, the equal treatment principle was not a general rule in most continental European
countries, many of which allowed for a price discount or restrictions on the quantity of outstanding shares for
which the offer must be made, trying to adapt the concept of the mandatory bid to specific local conditions. See
Berglöf et al., supra note 10; Ferrarini, supra note 10 at 23–24.
56 Rule 36.1 of the City Code states that “The Panel’s consent is required for any partial offer. In the case
of an offer which could not result in the offeror and persons acting in concert with it being interested in shares
carrying 30% or more of the voting rights of a company, consent will normally be granted.” See DAVIES &
WORTHINGTON, supra note 12 at 958–59; Enriques, supra note 10; Silja Maul & Athanasios Kouloridas, The
Takeover Bids Directive, 5 GER. L. J. (2004); CLERC et al., supra note 36 at 62–63.

88

EMORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW [Vol. 10

Brazil has been limited to cases of transfer of control, and primary acquisitions
of control do not trigger the requirement to share the control premium with
minority shareholders. This is particularly relevant to creeping acquisitions,
whereby the shareholder acquires shares in the secondary market until it has a
large enough percentage to control the company.57 In this sense, the Brazilian
MTR is close to a co-sale or a tag-along right, giving minority shareholders the
right to join a transaction of the controlling shareholder and sell their minority
stake. Therefore, the rule’s trigger depends on three conditions: (a) the preexistence of a controlling shareholder; (b) a transaction by which the controlling
shareholder transfers the controlling stake to another shareholder58; and (c) the
existence of a control premium, a surplus above the stock price, to be shared
with minority/non-controlling shareholders.
In 2007, RFS Holding, BV, acquired 94.17% of the shares of ABN Amro
Holding through a takeover. ABN Amro was the controlling shareholder of two
Brazilian listed companies – ABN Amro Arrendamento Mercantil, S.A. and
Real Leasing, S.A. – that became indirectly controlled by RFS. Even though this
transaction represented the indirect acquisition of over 50% of voting shares by
RFS, the CVM revoked a previous decision and concluded that it did not involve
the transfer of a controlling stake: before the RFS takeover, the largest
shareholders of the Brazilian listed companies owned stakes of 2–3%, so the
transaction did not qualify as a secondary transfer of control and, thus, article
254-A of the LSA did not apply.59
The rule’s trigger being a sale of control has material consequences: the
accumulation of shares above a predetermined threshold – even 50.01% of
voting shares – is not relevant per se. It is only relevant when such acquisition
derives from a transfer of control from an existing controlling shareholder. This
becomes clear when we read article 29 § 4 of Instrução CVM 361 (05/03/2002):
In the context of this Instruction, sale of control is the transaction, or
group of transactions, of sale of voting securities, or securities
convertible in voting securities, by a controlling shareholder or other
shareholders integrating the control group, by which a third party, or
57 Marcelo Godke Veiga & Erik Frederico Oioli, Convergence and Divergence in Capital Market Systems:
The Case of Brazil, 18 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 351 (2017). (As explained above, the Lehman amendment was
inspired by the wording of the pre-existing article 255º, which was triggered by the controlling shareholder of a
company subject to government approval agreeing to transfer the controlling position to a buyer. These
mechanics were replicated in article 254º).
58 The rule does not require that the controlling shareholder transfers all the controlling stake. For instance,
if a shareholder owning 55% of the voting shares sells 30% to a shareholder that already owns 21%, this would
qualify as the transfer of a controlling stake.
59 Id.
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group of concerted third parties, acquires the control of the company,
as defined by article 116 of Law 6.404/1976.

Article 116º of the LSA states that a controlling shareholder is the entity, or
group of entities bound by a shareholders’ agreement or commonly controlled,
that (a) owns rights that guarantee, on a permanent basis, the majority of voting
rights in the shareholders’ meeting, and the right to appoint the majority of board
members, and (b) exercises such power to direct the company’s activities and
the functioning of the company’s board. A shareholder (or group of
shareholders) owning over 50% of the voting rights (and exercising the
respective power) is clearly a controlling shareholder for the purposes of article
116. Therefore, if such controlling shareholder transfers its controlling
shareholding, article 254-A is triggered.60
Whether to apply the rule becomes complicated and controversial if the sale
of a minority position may, because of the target company’s dispersed ownership
structure, qualify as the sale of a controlling position. This problem divides
opinions. For scholars like Nelson Eizirik,61 the sale of a controlling block is the
sale of a position that guarantees the acquirer, regardless of any other
circumstances (such as the future attendance of shareholders’ meetings), the
ability to control the company in the future.62 A controlling block is a block with
over 50% of voting shares or a stake that guarantees permanently the majority
of voting rights (because the acquirer was already a shareholder or pursuant to a
shareholders’ agreement). This is in line with the classic opinion of
Comparato.63 For others, such as Erik Frederico Oioli,64 interpreting LSA article
254-A considering article 116º means it inevitably covers all transfers of a
controlling stake, regardless of the percentage involved.

60 See Nelson Eizirik, Aquisição de controle minoritário. Inexigibilidade de oferta pública, in PODER DE
CONTROLE E OUTROS TEMAS DE DIREITO SOCIETARIO E MERCADO DE C APITAIS 177, 182-84 (SÃO PAULO:
QUARTIER LATIN 2010). (Where over 50% of voting shares are sold, LSA article 254-A is clearly triggered
except when the selling shareholder does not exercise its controlling position. In accordance with article 116º of
the LSA, qualifying as a controlling shareholder depends on the effective exercise of the power to conduct the
companies’ activities. However, the fact that a shareholder does not qualify as a controlling shareholder for the
purposes of LSA article 116º – because it does not attend shareholders’ meetings or vote in board elections –
does not automatically imply that a block being sold is not a controlling block for the purposes of article 254-A,
which would trigger the MTR.).
61 Id. at 184-190; EIZIRIK, supra note 54 at 432-33.
62 Resolução CMN nº 401/1976 defined a controlling shareholder as an entity or group of entities party to
a shareholders’ agreement (or under common control) that owns shares guaranteeing the majority of votes in the
last three shareholders’ meetings. This rule was revoked in 2002 by Resolução CMN nº 2.927/2002.
63 Comparato & Salomão Filho, supra note 41 at 206-207.
64 Oioli, supra note 43 at 309–313.
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Notwithstanding that only a shareholding exceeding 50% of voting rights
constitutes a stable and guaranteed controlling stake, it is hard to accept that this
validly balances the interests of all shareholders, especially for companies with
dispersed ownership. In this sense, as the Brazilian experience clearly shows,
the use of a voting threshold would be a more effective and clear solution.
The legal dispute concerning Tim Participações, a telco listed on the
São Paulo Stock Exchange and ultimately controlled by Telecom Italia
S.p.A. (‘Telecom Italia’), was one of the most relevant legal cases in
Brazil.
Before 2009, the largest (indirect) shareholder of Telecom Italia was
Olimpia S.p.A (‘Olimpia’) with 17.99% of voting rights. Olimpia was
then controlled by Pirelli & C. S.p.A. (‘Pirelli’), with 80% of the votes,
while companies in the Sintonia III group held the remaining 20%. In
October 2007, a holding company incorporated by a new group of
shareholders – Assicurazioni Generalli S.p.A., Sintonia S.A., Intesa
Sanpaolo S.p.A., Mediobanca S.p.A., and Telefónica S.A. – acquired
shares in Olimpia that (combined with the shares of new shareholders)
gave the holding company 24.5% of voting rights in Telecom Italia.
Again, the dispute concerned the indirect effects of the transaction in
Brazil. Several minority shareholders of Tim Participações filed a
complaint with the CVM, arguing that Olimpia (and ultimately Pirelli)
was already the de facto controlling shareholder of Telecom Italia,
despite owing only 17.99% of voting shares. The CVM decided in
2009 that the MTR was triggered: in accordance with the applicable
rules, Italian law should determine if Olimpia was indeed the
controlling shareholder of Telecom Italia, while Brazilian law should
determine whether a mandatory takeover should be launched. In July
2009, the CVM revoked its first decision, ruling that while the concept
of de facto control is accepted in Italian law, Brazilian law should be
applied to determine what qualifies as a controlling position. For the
purposes of Brazilian law, the position of Olimpia in Telecom Italia
was not a controlling position. During the dispute, different CVM
directors stated contradictory positions on the possibility that a stake
below 50% of voting rights qualified as a controlling stake under LSA
article 254-A.65

The MTR is a premium-sharing solution, aiming to prevent a party from
obtaining control unless able to pay for the outstanding shares of all shareholders
under equal terms and conditions. This means the offeror cannot take control
without offering all shareholders at least the same control premium as the
controlling shareholder is paid. In this sense, the MTR is a consequence of the
65

Eizirik, supra note 54 at 431; Munhoz, supra note 46.
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equal-treatment principle,66 since all shareholders within each individual share
class are offered the same price, regardless of the number of shares they own. In
Europe – but not in Brazil – the MTR is also a structure intended to protect
minority shareholders against the emergence of a new controlling shareholder,
granting an exit right to all shareholders on favourable terms in case a change of
control occurs. In this sense, the MTR of the Takeover Directive complies with
both rationales, whereas the MTR of the LSA only complies with the first.
Coelce is one of the largest electrical power distribution companies of
Northeast Brazil and is listed on the São Paulo Stock Exchange. It was
controlled by the Spanish company Endesa (which owned 58.9% of
the share capital and 92% of voting shares through Investluz, S.A., a
local subsidiary). In September 2005, Gaz Natural launched a tender
offer trying to secure control over Endesa, which triggered a multiplayer 25-month dispute over control of the company that ended with
a successful takeover by Acciona and Enel. After the takeover, 92% of
shares in Endesa were jointly controlled by Enel (67.05%) and
Acciona (25.01%) in a holding company under a 10-year shareholder
agreement. Before the Gaz Natural offer, the largest shareholder of
Endesa held less than 6% of voting rights.
Endesa had a new controlling shareholder (more accurately, two new
controlling shareholders under a holding company and a shareholders’
agreement) while Coelce had a new (indirect) controlling shareholder.
One minority shareholder of Coelce, Fundo Fator Sinergia III, filed a
complaint with the CVM, arguing that the acquisition of control by the
new ultimate shareholders of Endesa should trigger the obligation to
launch a mandatory takeover. However, the complaint was rejected:
the acquisition of control of Endesa by Acciona and Enel was the
consequence of a takeover and not the result of a sale of control by a
former controlling shareholder, as there was no controlling shareholder
of Endesa before the takeover; therefore, there was no obligation to

66 See MICHAEL HOFFMANN-BECKING, MÜNCHENER HANDBUCH DES GESELLSCHAFTSRECHTS 4 123-25
(Beck 2020) (1988); TIM DRYGALA, ET AL., KAPITALGESELLSCHAFTSRECHT: MIT GRUNDZÜGEN DES KONZERN
UND UMWANDLUNGSRECHTS 538-39 (Springer 2012); YVES DE CORDT, L’ÉGALITÉ ENTRE ACTIONNAIRES 297
(Bruylant 2004).The fair and equal treatment of shareholders is a general principle in most jurisdictions and has
different implications. First, it implies that the shares of each class are homogeneous. Second, it implies that the
legal position of each shareholder in relation to each class of shares is equivalent. Shareholders cannot be
arbitrarily discriminated against (Untersagt ist nur die willkürliche). Nonetheless, this principle does not mean
that all shares, regardless of class, must be equal. This is quite clear in Germany, where the general equality rule
of § 53a of the Aktiengesetz has several exceptions, such as shares issued with special rights in accordance with
§§ 11, 12i, and 23III4 of the Aktiengesetz. Furthermore, this principle applies to relations between the company
and its shareholders but not necessarily to relations between the shareholders themselves. This is again quite
clear in jurisdictions such as Germany (under § 53a of the German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz)) but is
generally implied in most jurisdictions.
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launch a mandatory takeover. The case would have been decided
differently in Europe, where the MTR would have been triggered.
It is unquestionable that Coelce was controlled by Endesa. After the
takeover, 92% of shares in Endesa were jointly controlled by Enel
(67.05%) and Acciona (25.01%) in a holding company under a 10-year
shareholder agreement. However, because this new controlling
shareholder emerged when no controlling shareholder existed before
(the largest shareholder of Endesa previously held less than 6% of
voting rights), the MTR of LSA article 254-A was not triggered,
whereas the equivalent MTR in article 5 of the Takeover Directive
would have been activated.

IV. EQUITABLE PRICE
The Takeover Directive adopted a definition of ‘equitable price’ for the MTR
in line with article 9.5 of the City Code, taking as the primary criterion the
highest price paid in a certain period before the announcement of the offer .67 In
accordance with article 5(1), the mandatory bid must offer an ‘equitable price’.
Article 5(4) establishes that the ‘equitable price’ shall correspond to the highest
price paid for the same securities by the offeror, or by persons acting in concert,
over a period of six to twelve months before the bid. Under the same rule, as a
strong expression of the equality principle, if the offeror, or any person acting in
concert, purchases the relevant securities at a price higher than the offer price
after the bid is made public and before it closes, the offeror shall increase the
offer under the MTR.68
Article 5(2) of the Takeover Directive establishes that ‘where control has
been acquired following a voluntary bid made in accordance with this Directive
to all the holders of securities for all their holdings, the obligation laid down in
paragraph 1 to launch a bid shall no longer apply’. Technically, this exemption
can be used to avoid the equitable price requirements, since there are no
minimum requirements for the price of a voluntary bid. Where control is
acquired following a voluntary bid, it is assumed that the offer price was

67 Article 9.5(a) of the City Code states that “An offer made under rule 9 must, in respect of each class of
share capital involved, be in cash or be accompanied by a cash alternative at not less than the highest price paid
by the offeror or any person acting in concert with it for any interest in shares of that class during the 12 months
prior to the announcement of that offer. The Panel should be consulted where there is more than one class of
share capital involved.”
68 Under several national regulations, when the highest price paid by the bidder is below the market price
at the time when the obligation to bid arises (or the average weighted price of the shares during a reference time,
varying from 30 days to 12 months), the bid price shall be at least as high as the market price (or the average
weighted price during the relevant period). See Clerc, supra note 36 at 67.
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attractive enough to persuade a significant proportion of shareholders to accept
the offer. However, as the European Commission points out in its 2012 report
on the application of the directive, if the offeror already holds an interest very
close to the control threshold, only a few shareholders need to offer their shares
for the offeror to cross the threshold.69
The Takeover Directive also allows Member States (and their supervisory
authorities) to adjust the equitable price in several cases. 70 This optional
derogation gives a wide range of discretion to national regulations.71 Provided
the principles in article 3(1) are respected, Member States may authorize their
supervisory authorities to adjust the ‘equitable price’ in circumstances and in
accordance with criteria that are clearly determined. To that end, they may draw
up a list of circumstances in which the highest price may be adjusted (either
upwards or downwards), for example where the highest price was set by
agreement between the purchaser and a seller, where the market prices of the
securities in question have been manipulated, where market prices in general or
certain market prices in particular have been affected by exceptional
occurrences, or to enable the rescue of a firm in difficulty. National supervisory
authorities may also determine the criteria to be applied in such cases, such as
the average market value over a particular period, the break-up value of the
company, or other objective evaluation criteria. Most relevant here is the general
principle laid down in article 3(1)(a): ‘all holders of the securities of an offeree
company of the same class must be afforded equivalent treatment; moreover, if
a person acquires control of a company, the other holders of securities must be
protected’. The style of regulation underlying the equitable price definition –
which corresponds to the highest price paid for the same securities over a given

69 See Report of the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the
Application
of
Directive
2004/25/EC
on
takeover
bids,
(Jun.
28,
2012),
http://www.cdep.ro/afaceri_europene/CE/2012/COM_2012_347_EN_ACTE_f.pdf.
This
exemption is
unavailable in several Member States.
70 The highest price paid for the same shares over a certain period pre-bid is usually easy to calculate.
However, the criterion is not always representative of a fair minimum price for the bid, and national regulation
establish exceptions in which the supervisory authorities may disregard this price. Article 11.3 of the City Code
establishes several cases in which the bidder may dispense with the ‘highest price rule’ after consulting with the
Takeover Panel. Factors the Panel might consider include: (a) the size and timing of the relevant acquisitions;
(b) the attitude of the board of the offeree company; (c) whether interests in shares had been acquired at high
prices from directors or other persons closely connected with the offeror or the offeree company; and (d) the
number of shares in which interests have been acquired in the preceding 12 months.
71 See Thomas Papadopoulos, Acquisition of Corporate Control and Clear Criteria in the Adjustment of
the Mandatory Bid Price, 7 LAW & FIN. MARKETS REV. 97 (2013). (In AS v Oslo Børs ASA and Erik Must AS,
the Court of Justice of the European Free Trade Association States (“EFTA Court”) examined the conditions
and criteria applicable to adjustment of the mandatory bid price by national supervisory authorities (Case E1/10, EFTA Court Report 2009–2010).
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time while simultaneously giving Member States high flexibility in establishing
adjustments – was directly influenced by the recommendations of Chapter II of
the Winter Report.72
The equitable price rule is a direct consequence of the principle of equal
(‘equivalent’) treatment of shareholders. The function behind the rule is easy to
understand: minority or non-controlling shareholders must be treated at least as
favourably as the best-treated shareholders.
In Brazil, article 254-A of the LSA establishes the minimum price for the
mandatory bid in a totally different way, strictly envisaging that minority
shareholders share 80% of the price paid to the controlling shareholder. This
clearly represents a political compromise aiming to balance the advantages and
costs of the MTR, but there is no evidence of a clear economic rationale for the
80% figure. It is usually explained as a compromise between those advocating
the return of an MTR and those contending that the control premium is not
supposed to be shared with non-controlling shareholders (and/or that the overall
negative effects of the premium-sharing rule exceed the positive effects for
minority shareholders).73
This means that article 254-A of the LSA established a rule under which,
even in cases when the MTR is triggered, the control premium is shared only in
certain circumstances. The rule does not compel the new controller to offer 80%
of the premium; instead, it must offer 80% of the price paid to the controlling
shareholder. This means that minority shareholders will only share the control
premium if the price paid to the controlling shareholder is more than 25% above
the market price (price paid to the controlling shareholder X 0,8 > share price,
which means that price paid to the controlling shareholder > share price of X
(1/0,8), which means price paid to the controlling shareholder > (1+25%) X
share price).74
72 These derogations should be interpreted narrowly, but the level of fluctuation the rule allows clearly
implies deficient harmonization. See Winter, supra note 35; Papadopoulos, supra note 34; Eddy Wymeersch,
The Takeover Bid Directive, Light and Darkness 4-5 (Fin. L. Inst., Working Paper No. 2008-01, 2008),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1086987.
73 Munhoz, supra note 46 at 296. See also ROBERTA NIOAC PRADO, OFERTA PÚBLICA DE AÇÕES
OBRIGATÓRIA NAS SA: TAG ALONG (Quartier Latin. 2005), 112; Paulo Eduardo Penna, Preço das Ações na
Oferta Pública por Alienação de Controle de Companhia Aberta, 3 ATUALIDADES EM DIREITO SOCIETÁRIO E
MERCADO DE CAPITAIS (2018), 3.
74 The most recent relevant study found that the mean average control premium in Brazil is 24.37%:
Eduardo Lopes Junqueira, et al., Antecedents of the Control Premium in Brazilian Companies: a study of
acquisitions in the 21st century, 9 REVISTA DE ADMINISTRAÇÃO, C ONTABILIDADE E ECONOMIA DA FUNDACE
(2018). However, conclusions in the literature are highly inconsistent. For instance, in two studies by Nenova
conducted three years apart, the control premium was found to be 23% in 2003 and 41% in 2006: Tatiana
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Article 254-A of the LSA seems to make two assumptions: (a) that 80% of
the price paid for the controlling block’s shares is necessarily higher than the
market price of the shares (if minority shareholders can sell their shares in the
market for a better price, the mandatory bid obligation would seem worthless);
and (b) that the price paid for the controlling block is necessarily higher than the
market price. In practice, neither assumption is necessarily correct (although the
second is more reasonable), particularly in companies with limited free flow of
shares, in problematic economic conditions or, more generally, when for any
reason a low control premium (below the 25% threshold) is agreed with the
controlling shareholder. 75
Under the Takeover Directive, it is unquestionable that the MTR still applies
to a bid lower than the market price.76 However, that is not the case in Brazil.
Under the now revoked article 254 of the LSA, the CVM issued two
contradictory opinions on this. Opinion CVM/SJU nº 079/8377 considered that
the acquisition of shares for a price with no premium does not exempt the new
controller from the obligation to launch a mandatory bid. By contrast, opinion
CVM/SJU nº 007/8678 concluded that article 254º serves to share the control
premium with minority shareholders, not protect them against a non-liquid

Nenova, The value of corporate voting rights and control: A cross-country analysis, 68 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL
ECONOMICS (2003); Tatiana Nenova, Control values and changes in corporate law in Brazil, 6 LATIN AMERICAN
BUSINESS REVIEW (2006). See also Marcelo Fernandes & Vitor Frango de Souza, Voting Premium in the
Brazilian Equity Market, 34 BRAZILIAN REVIEW OF ECONOMETRICS (2014); Paul Hanouna, et al., Value of
corporate control: some international evidence, JOURNAL OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT (2001); Alexander
Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private benefits of control: An international comparison, 59 THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE
(2004). There are several possible explanations for the discrepancies, particularly regulatory changes (e.g., on
transparency, minority protection, and board composition) and key differences in ownership structure.
75 A listed company is allowed to establish a more demanding minimum price rule in its articles of
association. For instance, to be classified as Level 2 in the Novo Mercado, ‘the company and its controlling
shareholders must adopt and observe a wider range of corporate governance practices and minority shareholder
rights’. One specific requirement is that where ‘majority shareholders sell their stake, the same conditions
granted to them must be extended to common shareholders, while preferred shareholders must get, at least, 100%
of the value/conditions (tag along)’: https://www.b3.com.br/en_us/products-and-services/solutions-forissuers/listing-segments/nivel2/; see also OIOLI, Oferta pública de aquisição do controle de companhias abertas.
2010, 67; Munhoz, PODER DE CONTROLE E OUTROS TEMAS DE DIREITO SOCIETÁRIO E MERCADO DE CAPITAIS. SÃO
PAULO: QUARTIER LATIN, (2010), 310–311.
75 Id.
76 A bid launched at a price lower than the market price is not in all cases unnecessary. First, the market
may not be liquid, so a more favourable market price at a certain moment does not guarantee that the shareholder
will be able to sell its shares at that price. Second, the market price at a certain moment is not necessarily the
market price during the takeover acceptance period.
77 https://www.investidor.gov.br/pareceresJuridicos/arquivos/1983/Parecer_79_1983.html.
78 https://www.investidor.gov.br/pareceresJuridicos/arquivos/1986/Parecer_07_1986.html.
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market. Under the new article 254-A of the LSA the dominant opinion is that
the MTR does not apply if the takeover price is lower than the market price. 79
V. THE CONTRACTUAL MTR OF BRAZILIAN COMPANIES LISTED ON THE NOVO
MERCADO
A legal structure where the MTR is triggered only by the bilateral transfer of
a pre-existing controlling stake would have no material regulatory impact in a
market with highly concentrated shareholder ownership, such as the traditional
Brazilian stock market. With such high ownership concentration, the acquisition
of a controlling stake in a listed company would inevitably result from a bilateral
transfer of control agreement; it is virtually impossible to acquire that controlling
stake without the active engagement and agreement of the incumbent controlling
shareholder.80 This was the context of Brazil’s capital markets until the end of
the 20th century, but it started changing in the early years of the 21 st century,
when the number of IPOs increased dramatically and firms started listing in
special segments – particularly in the Novo Mercado – with higher standards of
corporate governance, lower levels of ownership concentration, and higher
compliance with the ‘one share, one vote’ rule.81
It would seem reasonable that a different ownership structure requires a
different MTR response, if not at the federal level, then at least through selfregulation. However, the regulatory framework of the Novo Mercado
established an MTR in line with the relevant LSA provision, assuming the preexistence of a controlling stake that is transferred to a new controlling
shareholder. Under article 8.2 of the Corporate Governance Level 2 Listing
Regulation, even the ‘acquisition of control pursuant to a series of transactions’
assumes there was a stock purchase agreement executed with the controlling
shareholder. This makes clear that a primary acquisition of control not involving

79 Lamy Filho & Pedreira, supra note 38 at 2013–2014. With a different opinion, see Eizirik, supra note
54 at 428-29.
80 ROBERTA NIOAC PRADO, DESCONCENTRAÇÃO DO PODER DE CONTROLE E POISON PILLS: EVOLUÇÃO NO
MERCADO DE C APITAIS BRASILEIRO 393-98 (Quartier Latin 2010). (The failed takeover of Perdigão by Sadia in
2006 is generally considered the first hostile takeover in Brazil, although the first attempt seems to have been in
1971, with the failed takeover of Sulbanco by Mercosul).
81 See Gorga, NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS, (2009); Oioli, Oferta
pública de aquisição do controle de companhias abertas, 69 and 79–86; Munhoz, “Transferência de controle
nas companhias sem controlador majoritário”, 297–309 and 311–316; Saito & Silveira, BRAZILIAN
ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, (2010), 8–9. (Bovespa launched its three listing premium levels in 2001: Level 1,
which requires additional disclosure practices; Level 2, which has all the requirements of Level 1 plus additional
corporate governance requirements (including tag-along rights of 100% for voting shares and 80% for nonvoting shares); and Novo Mercado, which is similar to Level 2 but does not accept listings of non-voting shares).
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the transfer of a controlling position – e.g. the typical case of a ‘ramassage
boursier’ or ‘escalada acionária’ (creeping acquisitions), with the progressive
acquisition of shares in the market – would not trigger a mandatory bid, in line
with article 254-A of the LSA.82
In a market with higher ownership dispersion, such as the Novo Mercado,
having no MTR for primary acquisitions of control (and triggered by a votingrights threshold) promotes a more efficient market for corporate control: third
parties can acquire minority stakes and progressively build a larger stake, while
minority shareholders are denied an exit right and a share of any control
premium. Conversely, for minority shareholders this represents a worse outcome
than the traditional combination of LSA article 254-A in a context of ownership
concentration: as the only available route for acquiring control of the company,
the new controlling shareholders would have to negotiate the control premium
with the incumbent controlling shareholder and this premium would eventually
be partially shared. This becomes even more material in a market with weaker
legal protection for shareholders, such as the Brazilian market. 83 The
combination of these factors led to an auto-regulatory movement mostly
envisaging the protection of blockholders.84
The IPO of Natura Cosméticos, S.A., in 2004, is generally considered
one of the most important and successful capital market offers in
Brazil. First, it is one of the first offers in the Novo Mercado and
inaugurated a successful trend of initial offers in this market. Second,
unlike previous initial offers in Brazil, the IPO dispersed only ordinary
voting shares. Third, this IPO inaugurated a trend that became very
popular over the next couple of years: setting clauses in the bylaws that
trigger mandatory takeovers after certain voting-rights thresholds are
met. In the case of Natura, article 33 of the bylaws set an MTR trigger
for acquisitions of over 15% of voting shares. Under this MTR, the
price extended to shareholders should be the highest of (i) the highest
market price of the share in the previous 12 months (not the weighted
82 In practical terms, it is highly unlikely that a shareholder would be able to go from zero to a controlling
position with stock exchange acquisitions. This is for two main reasons: (a) disclosure obligations – awareness
in the market that a certain shareholder is building a controlling position would increase the prices and diminish
liquidity; and (b) the rules concerning auctions of shares, particularly the Regulamento de Operações da Bolsa
de Valores do Estado de São Paulo and the Instrução CVM nº 168. However, it is plausible to put in place a
strategy of gradually increasing a material non-controlling position up until the moment it becomes a controlling
position.
83 Stijn Claessens & B. Burcin Yurtoglu, Corporate governance in emerging markets: A survey, 15
EMERGING MKTS. REV. 1 (2013); Saito & Silveira, supra note 45; Yuri Gomes Paiva Azevedo, Hellen Bomfim
Gomes, & Silvio Hiroshi Nakao, Poison pills and corporate governance: a study in the Brazilian stock market,
15 REVISTA DE CONTABILIDADE E ORGANIZAÇÕES 1 (2021).
84 Comparato & Salomão Filho, supra note 41 at 215-16.
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average price); (ii) the highest price paid for the share by the bidder in
the previous 12 months; and (iii) a value per share corresponding to a
valuation of 12 times EBITDA minus net debt; plus a premium of 50%.
Neither the trigger threshold nor the mandatory price is compatible or
coherent with the principles of the MTR. This clause was later revised
to establish an MTR threshold of 25% of the total number of shares
issued by the company (article 34º), with the mandatory offer price
corresponding to:
(i) the highest unit price achieved by shares issued by the
Company during the period of twelve (12) months prior to the
OPA in any stock exchange in which the Company’s shares are
traded, (ii) the highest unit price paid by the Relevant
Shareholder, at any time, for one share or tranche of shares
issued by the Company; and (iii) the amount equivalent to
twelve (12) times the Company’s Average Consolidated
EBITDA (…) minus the Company’s net consolidated debt,
divided by the total number of shares issued by the Company.
According to Natura’s 2001 Report on the Brazilian Code of
Corporate Governance:
the criteria for the determination of the tender offer price are
provided for in paragraph 2 of article 34 of the Company’s
Bylaws and do not impose any addition of premiums on the
economic value or market value of the Company’s shares. The
combination of proposed criteria for the determination of the
tender offer price protects the Company and its shareholders
from opportunistic investors who could take advantage of the
high volatility of the Brazilian market to acquire a relevant
participation in a time of instability without the obligation to
make a tender offer. However, the possibility that, in
exceptional market situations and beyond the Company’s
control, the use of the adopted criteria may result in an amount
potentially higher than the market value at the time of the event
cannot be ruled out.
The controlling shareholders own 38.609% of the company’s shares.85

Many companies listed on the Novo Mercado approved equivalent
provisions triggering the obligation to launch a mandatory takeover bid, with
thresholds usually set between 10% and 35%, regardless of the cause for the
transfer of control (i.e. not connecting the MTR trigger to a secondary
transaction transferring a controlling stake). This trend represents an interesting

85

Id.
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self-regulatory response86 of the companies and shareholders to the
insufficiencies of an MTR that is difficult and complex and gives minority
shareholders limited protection. However, in most cases this regulatory
movement has a different inspiration, aiming not to replace the MTR but rather
to protect the best interests of blockholders.
These bylaw clauses are the so-called Brazilian poison pills or tropicalized
poison pills. It seems ironic that these MTR-trigger provisions in the articles of
association are designated as ‘poison pills’: they are close to the regulatory
framework of the Takeover Directive, and distinct from the ‘poison pill’ concept
that became popular in the US in the late 1980s as a way for the boards of hostiletakeover targets to gain negotiating leverage.87 In practice, however, most of the
provisions function as an aggressive defence of incumbent blockholders against
hostile takeovers, rather than a self-regulatory response to the insufficiencies of
the LSA’s MTR. That is the case where the threshold trigger is incoherently low
or the price calculation model makes the acquisition of control absurdly
expensive. 88 To work as a ‘contractual’ MTR, and not as a pure hostile-takeover
defence, reasonable coherence is required between the voting threshold
triggering the mandatory bid and the voting-rights percentage that effectively
grants control of the company. That is the reason most EU Member States do
not mandate a bid when the relevant threshold is met but the acquirer convinces
the regulator that no control was acquired. A good example is article 187.2 of
the Portuguese Securities Code, which establishes a ‘negative demonstration of
control’: a mandatory bid is not required when the relevant entity proves before
the Securities Exchange Commission, the Comissão do Mercado de Valores
Mobiliários, that although it owns more than 33.3% of voting shares, it has no
effective control over the target company.
Most Brazilian companies establish thresholds between 15% and 20%. In
some exceptional cases, the threshold is established at 10%,89 which is, without
question, incoherently low. Conversely, it is no coincidence that most thresholds
are set at a level below the blockholder’s voting percentage, creating a privileged
position for the incumbent blockholder since no third party will be able to
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OIOLI, Regime jurídico do capital disperso na lei das SA. 2019, 329–330.
See Andrew L. Bab & Sean P. Neenan, Poison Pills in 2011, 3 DIR. NOTES SERIES (2011); Ofer Eldar &
Michael Wittry, The Return of Poison Pills: A First Look at “Crisis Pills”, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP.
GOVERNANCE (2020).
88 See Carlos Klein Zanini, A Poison Pill Brasileira: Desvirtuamento, Antijuridicidade e Ineficiência, in
TEMAS DE DIREITO SOCIETÁRIO E EMPRESARIAL C ONTEMPORÂNEOS 258-61 & 264-70 (SÃO PAULO: MALHEIROS
2011); Oioli, supra note 43 at 330-31.
89 This corresponds to the threshold for the right of the minority shareholder to elect a member of the
supervisory board – ‘conselho fiscal’ – in accordance with article 161º of the LSA.
87

100

EMORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW [Vol. 10

challenge its position.90 Finally, many of these provisions in the articles of
association set price conditions clearly beyond what may be considered
equitable.
Several clauses were ‘entrenched’ in the articles of association, protected by
clauses triggering a mandatory bid by those shareholders that vote to revoke the
clause.91 These were the so-called ‘cláusulas pétreas’ (‘clauses set in stone’ or
‘eternity clauses’), a concept imported from constitutional law where it refers to
those constitutional rules not subject to ordinary revision. In 2009, the CVM
(Parecer de Orientação nº 36/2009) concluded such clauses breached several
rules of the LSA (articles 115º, 121º, 122º, 129º) and were legally ineffective. In
2010, Bovespa (the São Paulo Stock Exchange) approved several rules including
the prohibition of bylaw provisions that hinder voting for changes to other
provisions or that impose a penalty on shareholders approving bylaw changes
(applicable to Novo Mercado and Level 2).92
According to recent research, 55 companies (around 25%) listed on the Novo
Mercado have adopted similar clauses.93 If the sample is restricted to the 84
Novo Mercado companies without a shareholder holding over 50% of voting
rights (Level 1 and Level 2), 56% set equivalent bid rules in their respective
bylaws.94
CONCLUSION
There are generally perceived to be two different regulatory systems
concerning the MTR. Hybrid solutions, such as the Brazilian MTR adopted by
the LSA, are particularly interesting. First, they show us the historical context
and the path dependence of each regulatory solution. Second, they provide
90 Munhoz, supra note 46 at 312-13. Some bylaws go even further by stipulating that when a shareholder
owning shares above a predetermined threshold (usually 5–30%) intends to acquire more shares, it must do so
through a public auction. This kind of statutory clauses has questionable legality, since LSA article 36º
purportedly upholds the free negotiation of the shares of listed/public companies.
91 Zanini, supra note 88 at 261-62.
92 Munhoz, supra note 46 at 312-13; Gorga, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER, (2015), 6;
https://conteudo.cvm.gov.br/legislacao/pareceres-orientacao/pare036.html.
93 Azevedo et al., supra note 83. This percentage is in line with that found by a study of 217 non-financial
publicly traded companies: Henrique Portulhak et al., Poison Pills e Gerenciamento de Resultados: Estudo em
Companhias do Novo Mercado da BM&FBovespa, 13 REVISTA UNIVERSO CONTÁBIL 25 (2017). Moreover, the
number of companies adopting this kind of clauses is increasing: see Jorge Vieira, Eliseu Martins, & Luiz Paulo
Lopes Favero, Poison pills no Brasil: um estudo exploratório, 20 REVISTA CONTABILIDADE & FINANÇAS 50
(2009).
94 Érica Gorga, Changing the paradigm of stock ownership from concentrated towards dispersed
ownership: evidence from Brazil and consequences for emerging countries, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. (2009),
45–46.
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valuable insights into whether such regulation is being pushed in the direction
of the market rule system or the sharing rule system.
The original roots of the MTR in both the Takeover Directive and in
Brazilian regulations, dating back about half a century, have dramatically
impacted the solutions adopted today. The MTR of the Takeover Directive is
structured as a rule giving all shareholders an option to sell out – an exit option
– on favourable terms if a new controlling shareholder emerges (regardless of
whether this results from a secondary transfer of control) and requiring any
control premium to be shared by all shareholders. This was inspired by the first
version of the MTR in the City Code. In Brazil, the MTR of article 254-A of the
LSA is only triggered by the bilateral transfer of a pre-existing ‘controlling’
stake in a listed company; in this sense, it is a (limited) sharing rule but not an
exit rule. It is inspired by the mechanics and wording of article 255º of the LSA.
For minority/non-controlling shareholders, the Brazilian MTR is rather
ineffective. First, the rule is triggered only by secondary transfers of a
controlling stake. Second, it ignores controlling stakes below 50% of voting
shares and is not triggered by a predetermined threshold of voting rights (e.g.
30%, 33%). Third, non-controlling shareholders are not offered the same terms
and conditions as the controlling shareholder receives, since the price of the
mandatory bid is equivalent to 80% of the price paid to the controlling
shareholder. This inefficiency was uncontroversial for decades as the Brazilian
stock exchanges were characterized by highly concentrated shareholder
ownership. However, it became problematic when new IPOs started adhering to
the requirements of special listing segments with higher standards of corporate
governance, lower levels of ownership concentration, and higher compliance
with the ‘one share, one vote’ rule.
The market’s correction of the LSA rule’s inefficiency was not natural.
Contrary to the US regulatory solution, incumbent blockholders in Brazil were
unwilling to control companies with minority stakes without proper antitakeover protection. Regulatory inefficiency was thus corrected by setting
predetermined thresholds in the articles of association that trigger a mandatory
takeover bid. However, the provisions have typically been structured to favour
the incumbent blockholder, and thus function as aggressive defences against
hostile takeovers, rather than a reasonable self-regulatory response to the
insufficiencies of the LSA’s MTR. Threshold triggers have been set at
incoherently low levels and the price calculation models for mandatory
takeovers have made it virtually impossible to acquire control. Also, several
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clauses were entrenched in the articles of association, protected by clauses
triggering a mandatory bid by those shareholders that vote to revoke the clause.
Overall, the inefficiencies persist for minority shareholders. article 254-A of
the LSA continues to grant limited protection, while most of the MTR provisions
established in listed companies’ bylaws work as anti-takeover defences, not
effective exit clauses guaranteeing equitable terms and conditions. In practice,
minority shareholders are in a worse position than two decades ago.
The Brazilian MTR, as a hybrid between the EU’s strong sharing rule system
and the US open market rule system, has evolved in a third direction: it does not
grant minority shareholders effective protection (equivalent to the European
MTR) yet imposes strong limitations on the effectiveness of the market for
corporate control (unlike the US regulatory approach). Most probably, the only
way out of the current scenario is through federal intervention through amending
the LSA.

